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SECTION 17A(2) OBJECTIONS TO DISCHARGE
FILED BY SMALL LOAN COMPANIES
IN CONSUMER BANKRUPTCIES:
A PRACTICAL ANALYSIS*
THE ULTIMATE PURPOSE of the Bankruptcy Act' has been correctly
characterized as being twofold: 2 to distribute the bankrupt's assets fairly
among his creditors 3 and to "[Rielieve the honest debtor from the weight
of oppressive indebtedness...,,4 thereby to accomplish the debtor's
economic rehabilitation. 5 Problems arise, however, when the debtor has
not been honest in his efforts to obtain money or property on credit.
The Bankruptcy Act has oftentimes been construed to apply only to
the honest debtor 6 and, therefore, to the exclusion of the dishonest debtor
who has, in some manner, negated his right to the economic revitalization
that the Bankruptcy Act can provide.7 This comment will explore only
one dishonest practice that can result in a section 17 objection to
* A review of the reported cases in the American Bankruptcy Law Journal (formerly
the Journal of the National Association of Referees in Bankruptcy) for 1971-1972,
dealing with § 17a(2) objections to discharge under the Bankruptcy Act, filed by small
loan and finance companies, coupled with over two years of substantive experience in
the finance industry has led to the formulation of this comment. It appears from
this review of the reported cases (and from personal experience) that bankruptcy
courts are very much one-sided in their views regarding §17a(2) objections to
discharge filed by finance companies in consumer bankruptcies (of the 17 reported
"false financial statement" cases dealing with small loan creditors §17a(2) objections
to discharge, only two were decided in favor of the objecting creditor). The
implications of this conclusion deserve some analysis because of the obvious effects
such a conclusion would have upon: (1) any decision to file a §17a(2) objection to
discharge; (2) the true burden of proof regarding §17a(2) objections to discharge;
(3) the right (if any) to jury determination of §17a(2) objection cases; (4) the proper
procedure finance companies should follow in order to successfully litigate §17a(2)
objection cases. Furthermore, the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States has recently recommended that §17a(2) objections to discharge be eliminated.
The obvious implications of this proposal will be discussed in the conclusion.
1 30 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§1-1255 (1970), hereinafter cited as,
Bankruptcy Act.
2 See Comment, Bankruptcy Act: Abuse of Sections 14C(3) and 17A(2) by Small
Loan Companies, 32 IND. L.J. 151 (1957). See also B. WEINTRAUB & H. LEVIN,
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO BANKRUPTCY AND DEBTOR RELIEF 1 (1964).
3 See, e.g., Dilworth v. Boothe, 69 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1934).
4 Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-5 (1915);
see Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
5 See Letter from Harold Marsh, Jr., to The President, The Chief Justice of the
United States, The Congress, July 30, 1973, in Report of the Commission on
Bankruptcy Laws, 251 BANKR. L. REP. (extra ed. August 3, 1973).
6 See, e.g., Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934); Williams v. United States
Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 236 U.S. 549 (1915).
7 See Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Golombosky, 133 Conn. 317, 324, 50 A.2d 817, 820
(1946).
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discharge-objections based upon the debtor's obtaining money or
property on credit after uttering a materially false financial statement
in writing with the intent to deceive and cause the creditor to rely
thereon in granting credit.8
Under our present bankruptcy laws, a debtor who fies a petition for
bankruptcy is entitled to a discharge upon the court's adjudication that he
is bankrupt,9 unless such bankrupt has committed one or more certain
specified acts which negate his right to a release from all of his provable
debts.10 Setting aside section 14 objections to discharge which will not be
considered in this comment," a creditor may, under section 17, file an
application with the bankruptcy court for a determination regarding the
dischargeability of such creditor's individual claim.12 If a creditor correctly
contends that the bankrupt has obtained money or property on the basis
of a materially false financial statement, the creditor's claim will not be
discharged and the debtor will remain legally obligated to that
creditor.' 3 In reality, bankruptcy courts are not amenable to granting
some creditor's objections to discharge under section 17 of the
Bankruptcy Act.' 4 The consequences of this conclusion will be the
substance of the discussion that follows.
I. Small Loan Companies' Procedure in
Granting Credit to a Consumer
When a consumer desires to obtain a loan from a small loan or
finance company, he normally telephones the company and completes an
initial credit application. Ordinarily, the creditor will take information
8 See Bankruptcy Act §17a(2), 11 U.S.C. §35a(2) (1970) which provides:
(a) A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his proveable
debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such as... (2) are liabilities
for obtaining money or property by false pretenses or false representations, or
for obtaining money or property on credit or obtaining an extension or renewal
of credit in reliance upon a materially false statement in writing respecting his
financial condition made or published or caused to be made or published in any
manner whatsoever with intent to deceive, or for willful and malicious conversion
of the property of another; ...
9See Bankruptcy Act §14a, 11 U.S.C. §32a (1952).
19See Bankruptcy Act §17, 11 U.S.C. §35 (1970). A bankruptcy discharge does not
operate as a release from all debts, but rather as a bar to their enforcement. See
generally Helms v. Holmes, 129 F.2d 263, 266 (4th Cir. 1942).
"Section 14c(3) objections to discharge now apply only to business bankrupts and
therefore are beyond the scope of this comment. However, case law arising under
§14c(3) that is analagous or applicable to §17a(2) will sometimes be cited; see
Bankruptcy Act §14c(3), 11 U.S.C. §32c(3) (1970).
12 See Bankruptcy Act §17c, 11 U.S.C. §35c (1970).
13See Bankruptcy Act §17a, 11 U.S.C. §35a (1970).
14 See prefatory remarks supra. See also Friebolin, Re-Examination of Section 14(c) as
a Ground for Objection to Discharge, 39 MINN. L. REv. 673, 686-7 (1955) (Referee
Friebolin therein reports the results of a national survey of bankruptcy referees. He
reported that many referees believed that objections to discharge filed by small loan
companies should be eliminated. It seems that referees generally believe that small




Akron Law Review, Vol. 7 [1974], Iss. 3, Art. 8
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol7/iss3/8
Spring, 1974]
regarding the consumer's place of employment, his past and present credit
references, his marital status and other pertinent information designed to
indicate the consumer's credit worthiness. After this initial information
has exchanged hands, the creditor will complete a credit investigation to
verify the consumer's information and to obtain some indication of the
consumer's past employment and credit habits.15 If the creditor approves
this initial application, he will then ask the consumer to come into his
office to complete the application procedure. At this point, the creditor
will require that the consumer complete a formal application-financial
statement 16 upon which the creditor will, in part, make his final decision
to grant the loan. If the consumer's formal financial statement does
not materially depart from the information that the creditor obtained
during his credit investigation and from the consumer's first application,
the loan will usually be granted at that point. However, if there is
some substantial discrepancy, the creditor may defer final approval
pending a reinvestigation of the consumer's credit background.
If the debtor repays the loan according to the loan agreement, no
further credit investigation would take place. However, if the debtor
begins to default upon his obligation to the creditor, the creditor may
begin a reinvestigation of the debtor's application-financial statement in
an effort to determine why the debtor is not repaying the loan. Usually
this reinvestigation does not take place unless and until the debtor files
a petition in bankruptcy.
Once the creditor receives formal notification of the debtor's
application for discharge, he will begin an analysis of the debtor's formal
financial statement to determine if the debtor misled him at the time the
loan was granted. Normally the creditor will compare the debtor's
schedule of liabilities as filed with his petition for discharge, with the
debtor's financial statement as completed when the loan was granted. If
a substantial discrepancy exists in the amount of the debtor's other
indebtedness as listed in the financial statement, the creditor will then
determine if he should file an objection to discharge on the basis of
section 17a(2).
15The thoroughness of any credit investigation will often depend upon a company's
particular procedure, but it must be remembered that creditors do not have unlimited
investigatory powers. Some debts, if not disclosed by the debtor, are simply not
ascertainable (an inter-family loan, a purchase money security agreement with some
retail store, an unsecured credit union loan, etc.). Often, credit bureaus have little, if
any recent information. Similarly, some establishments will not give out any credit
information at all. Consequently, a small loan creditor must in some cases depend
almost totally upon the information it receives from the debtor.
16 Financial statement forms differ from one company to another, but for an example
of a relatively simplistic form see Appendix I. For an example of a more comprehen-
sive form see Appendix II. Creditors would be well advised to adopt a comprehensive
form because of some courts' criticism of the simplistic-type forms. See, e.g., Sun
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I. Decisions to File Section 17A(2) Objections to Discharge
Before making any determination regarding a section 17a(2)
objection to discharge, a creditor must be absolutely sure that the debtor
had, in fact, been dishonest in his efforts to obtain money or property
from that creditor. In the past, small loan companies have been very
severely criticized because of their unscrupulous practices in objecting to
a bankrupt's discharge,'17 and for this reason they cannot be too careful in
making their decision to file an objection. In fact, some commentators' 8
and even some courts 19 have contended that oftentimes small loan
creditors will actually encourage debtors to make less than a complete
and full statement of their outstanding liabilities and thereby render their
financial statement ipso facto false. Others have contended that the small
loan creditors do not, in fact, rely upon the formal financial statement
but instead require it merely to insure themselves that they may have
some basis upon which to object to a debtor's bankruptcy in the event
that that does take place-"
In reality, these negative inferences have no basis or support in
today's business community.Y Almost all lending institutions require
debtors to complete some type of application-financial statement so that
they will have some basis upon which to grant credit. The assumption
that any creditor requires such a statement primarily to protect himself in
the event that a debtor takes bankruptcy is without foundation.22
Once it has been determined that a debtor has, in fact, uttered a
17See, e.g., In re Forgay, 140 F. Supp. 473, 478 (D. Utah 1956); In re Anderson,
104 F. Supp. 599, 604-5 (E.D. Wis. 1952). See also Friebolin, Re-Examination of
Section 14(c) as a Ground for Objection to Discharge, 39 MINN. L. REV. 673 (1955);
Comment, Bankruptcy Act: Abuse of Sections 14C(3) and 17A(2) by Small Loan
Companies, 32 IND. LJ. 151 (1957).
18 See, e.g., Friebolin, Re-Examination of Section 14(c) as a Ground for Objection to
Discharge, 39 MINN. L. REV. 673 (1955); Comment, Bankruptcy Act: Abuse of
Sections 14C(3) and 17A(2) by Small Loan Companies, 32 IND. LJ. 151 (1957).
19 See, e.g., In re Forgay, 140 F. Supp. 473, 478 (D. Utah 1956); In re Anderson, 104
F. Supp. 599, 604-5 (E.D. Wis. 1952).
2OSee, e.g., Household Finance Corp. v. Groscost, 230 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1956);
Helms v. Holmes, 129 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1942) (dissenting opinion); In re Anderson,
104 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Wis. 1952).
21 See Proposed Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act Treated in Position Paper Filed
by National Consumer Finance Association with National Bankruptcy Commission,
26 PERs. FIN. LQ. REP. 51 (1972) wherein it is stated: "It is respectfully submitted
that whatever criticism or claimed abuse existed prior to ... [1970] can no longer be
considered as a factual or emotional ground upon which to recommend the elimination
of the right to question whether a debt should be discharged in a bankruptcy
proceeding."
22 The percentage of small loan companies' losses due to consumer bankruptcies is
relatively small. In fact total losses charged to bad debt (which includes losses other
than bankruptcies) are often less than 2% of total receivables. See, e.g., Report to
the Shareholders of Beneficial Corporation 24 (1972) (eleven-year summary) (The
percentage of receivables charged off after offsetting recoveries, to average monthly
balances amounted to only 1.11%-1.56% for the last eleven years. Surely this small
percentage cannot justify the assumption that small loan creditors encourage debtors
to complete false financial statements).
[Vol. 7:3
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 7 [1974], Iss. 3, Art. 8
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol7/iss3/8
materially false financial statement, the creditor must be sure that his case
meets the procedural prerequisites necessary to prove and substantiate his
section 17a(2) objection. The creditor must prove, inter alia, that the
financial statement was materially false; that money or property was
obtained on the basis of the false financial statement; that the creditor
relied upon the financial statement when extending credit, and that the
debtor intended to deceive the creditor by uttering the false financial
statement. 25 The burden of proof regarding these procedural essentials
rests squarely upon the objecting party.24
A. The Financial Statement Must Have Been Materially False
The question of whether or not a financial statement is materially
false admittedly depends upon the facts in each case. Consequently, no
set rules can be enunciated which would be applicable to all cases
generally. However, a substantial and material omission or understatement
of a debtor's liabilities is often considered to be sufficient grounds to
maintain a section 17a(2) objection to discharge.25
An exact dollars and cents deviation from a debtor's true liabilities
at the time of the loan approval would be difficult to present, but some
courts have held that as little as a few hundred dollars deviation is
sufficient. 26 One noted commentator has stated that "A financial statement
usually will be considered ... materially false when the total of the undis-
closed obligations is more than twice as great as the sum borrowed.... ."27
Whether or not a specific omission of certain liabilities is material should
depend upon the sum borrowed, i.e., if a loan of $2,000.00 is extended on
the basis of a false financial statement, an omission of $50.00 in liabilities
should not be as material as in a situation where the loan amount is only
$200.00, because in the former case the omission amounts to 1/40 of the
sum borrowed while in the latter case it accounts for 1/4 of the total sum
borrowed. Even though most courts have been understandably hesitant to
develop a hard and fast "deviation rule," many have used some sort
of deviation-type standard to determine whether or not a particular
omission is material.28
23 See, e.g., In re Schweizer, 271 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1959); Industrial Bank of
Commerce v. Bissell, 219 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1955); In re Stone, 172 F. Supp. 142
(E.D.N.Y. 1959). See also 1A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 17.16 (14th ed. 1972);
8 H. REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 3320 (6th ed. 1955).
24 See IA W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 17.31 (14th ed. 1972); Note, Proof of Reliance
on False Financial Statements in Actions Against Bankruptcy, 14 PEns. FIN. L.Q. REP.
104 (1960). See also BANKRUPTCY RULES AND OFFICIAL BANKRUPTCY FORMS, Rule
407 (1973); Comment, Fraudulent Financial Statements and Section 17 of the
Bankruptcy Act-The Creditor's Dilemma, 1967 UTAH L. REv. 281, 284.
25 See L. TwNEM, BANKRUPTCY GUIDE FOR CONSUMER FINANCE COMPANIES 123 (6th
ed. 1964).
26See, e.g., In re Levine, 28 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
2 7 
See L TWINEM, BANKRUPTCY GUIDE FOR CONSUMER FINANCE COMPANIES 124 (6th
ed. 1964).
2 SSee, e.g., Public Loan Corp. v. Adams, 66 So.2d 6 (La. App. 1953).
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Whether or not an omission is material should similarly depend upon
the completeness of the lender's financial statement form. If the creditor
uses a relatively simple financial statement form, 29 he may not be able to
present an adequate objection if the debtor omitted a liability to a
particular creditor, such as a lessor, which the average consumer-debtor
may not consider a creditor at all. These problems can be overcome by
providing the debtor with detailed financial statements which explicitly
point out specific groups of creditors that are to be included in the
financial statement. 30 If a financial statement requires a detailed disclosure
of all creditors of every type, this fact will go to buttress a creditor's
objection when a particular debtor claims that he did not remember
to list one or more particular liabilities.
Aside from questions regarding the omission of certain liabilities,
another factor which might result in a section 17a(2) objection may be
based upon a debtor's overstatement of his income.3' If a debtor
substantially and materially overstates his income on the financial
statement, the creditor may be misled as to such debtor's ability to repay
the loan.3 2 Once again, the debtor's deviation from the true state of facts
should depend upon the amount of the overstatement, i.e., if a debtor
overstates his income by 25%, this misrepresentation would not be as
material as an overstatement of 50-100%. 33 As unsettling as these
conclusions may be, the fact still remains that each case must of
necessity, depend upon its own particular circumstances.
B. Money or Property Must Have Been Obtained on the
Basis of the Financial Statement
In order to successfully litigate a section 17a(2) objection to
discharge, a creditor must prove that as a result of the debtor's utterance
of the materially false financial statement, he extended and lost money
or property.34 The rendition of services does not come within the "money
or property" requirement of section 17a(2).35
Objections to discharge are allowed in part, to prevent "[Tihe
bankrupt from retaining the benefits of property acquired by fraudulent
means." 36 Therefore, the creditor must show that he has been deprived of
some type of property that he otherwise would not have relinquished, on
29 See Appendix I.
3o See Appendix II.
31See, e.g., In re Sam, Bankr. No. 71-2075 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (Bankrupt overstated
his income by 100%).
32 id.
33 Id.
34 See 8 H. REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 3322 (6th ed. 1955).
35 See, e.g., Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558 (1915); Hisey v. Lewis-Gale Hospital, 27
F. Supp. 20 (W.D. Va. 1939). See also 1A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 17.16(2), at
1632.1 (14th ed. 1972).
3 Rudstrom v. Sheridan, 122 Minn. 262, 265, 142 N.W. 313, 314 (1939).
[Vol. 7:3
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the basis of the debtor's false representations.3 7 This theory seems to
be based upon general principles of unjust enrichment, i.e., the debtor
should not be allowed to benefit from his own wrong.
The requirement that money or property must have been obtained
has some particular significance when one considers that creditors often
renew existing loans to advance the debtor additional money. When this
is done, the lender normally requires that the debtor complete a new
financial statement to certify his then existing economic status. Thus if a
lender grants an additional sum of money to a debtor on the basis of
a second financial statement which proves to be materially false, this
constitutes obtaining money or property within the contemplation of
section 17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act.
38
Assuming for a moment, that a particular debtor had at first, obtained
money on the basis of a true and complete financial statement, and then
sometime later, obtained an additional loan amount on the basis of a
material false financial statement, the question arises as to whether or not
the total loan (the original amount minus repayments, coupled with the
renewal amount), should be subject to a section 17a(2) objection. Prior
to the 1960 amendment to section 17a(2), 39 the phrase "obtaining an
extension or renewal of credit" was not present in section 17a(2), and
some courts held that the entire obligation was not non-dischargeable
upon a creditor's successful section 17a(2) objection.40 However, after
the 1960 amendment was enacted, courts generally determined that a
debtor's utterance of a materially false financial statement to obtain an
extension or renewal of credit would result in a non-dischargeable debt
as to the entire amount of liability outstanding.41
C. The Objecting Creditor Must Have Relied Upon the
Financial Statement When Extending Credit
This third element must be established if a creditor is to successfully
litigate a section 17a(2) objection to discharge. If the creditor has not in
fact relied upon the financial statement in extending credit, he cannot be
heard to complain.4 Oftentimes, this requirement is an unsurmountable
37 See 8 H. REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 3322 (6th ed. 1955).
38 See Bankruptcy Act § 17a(2), 11 U.S.C. § 35a(2) (1970).
39 Act of July 12, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-621.
40 See, e.g., Personal Finance Co. v. Murphy, 53 So.2d 421 (La. App. 1951); Carville
v. Lane, 116 Me. 332, 101 A. 968 (1917); Household Finance Corp. v. Christian, 8
Wis.2d 53, 98 N.W.2d 390 (1959). But see Personal Finance Co. v. Bruns, 16 NJ.
Super. 133, 84 A.2d 32 (N.J. Super., App. Div. 1951). See generally IA W. COLLIER,
BANKRUPTCY 3321 (6th ed. 1955).
41See, e.g., M-A-C Loan Plan, Inc. v. Cooper, 23 Conn. Sup. 184, 179 A.2d 313
(1961); First Credit Corp. v. Wellmitz, 21 Wis.2d 18, 123 N.W.2d 519 (1963). See
also Brown, Full Amount of Bankrupt's Indebtedness to Lender Non-Dischargeable-
Where Loan Obtained by False Financial Statement, 16 PEas. FIN. L.Q. REp. 41
(1962).
42 See 8 H. REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 3322 (6th ed. 1955).
COMMENTSSpring, 19741
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hurdle which many creditors cannot seem to overcome.43
As pointed out earlier,44 many courts believe that creditors do not in
fact rely upon the financial statement and therefore should not be heard
to complain. 45 The basis for this belief generally rests upon the assumption
that small loan creditors do not place much emphasis on the formal
financial statement because they have in fact, investigated the applicant
before extending credit.4 However, a small loan creditor's investigatory
powers are often severely limited and in actuality, these investigations
may reveal little, if any substantive information.47 Consequently, small
loan creditors (like most other creditors) require the completion of a
formal financial statement to insure that they have done all that is
possible to ascertain a debtor's true financial condition.4
Generally, there must be a distinct causal connection between the
utterance of the financial statement and the granting of credit. 49 Stated
another way, an action of the debtor (completion of the financial
statement) must result in a reaction from the creditor (granting of the
desired credit). The creditor must have granted the credit on the basis
of the financial statement,50 although he need not have granted the
credit on the sole basis of this information. "1 Partial reliance upon
the financial statement has oftentimes been construed to be sufficient
to meet the reliance requirements.52
Considering the skepticism that exists among many courts as to small
loan companies' reliance upon the financial statements,53 the burden of
proving reliance may be a formidable one indeed. Creditors may, in part,
43 See Note, Proof of Reliance on Financial Statements in Actions Against Bankrupts,
14 P aRs. FIN. L.Q. REP. 104 (1960).
44 See text accompanying note 21 supra.45See 8 H. REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 3322 (6th ed. 1955): "It is essential tobringing a claim within this exception that the creditor have relied upon the falsepretenses or representations and been induced thereby to part with money or
property" [footnote omitted].46 See, e.g., Accounts Supervision Co. v. Atley, 89 So.2d 508 (Fla. App. 1956). But see
In re Applebaum, 11 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1926); Utah Finance Co. v. Patrick, 398
Pac.2d 200 (Utah 1965).
47 See note 14 supra.
4 Often, a debtor will think twice before falsifying information on a formal financial
statement form. Creditors should emphasize the importance and significance of thefinancial statement and thoroughly instruct the debtor as to its contents.4 9 See L. TWINEM, BANKRUPTCY GUIDE FOR CONSUMER FINANCE COMPANIES 145 (6th
ed. 1964).
50See 8 H. REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 3322 (6th ed. 1955).
5' See National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Johnson, 317 Mass. 485, 58 N.E.2d 849
(1945).
52 See, e.g., Banks v. Siegel, 181 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1950); Yates v. Boteler, 163 F.2d
953 (9th Cir. 1947); First National Bank v. Clancy, 279 F. Supp. 820 (D. Colo.1968); Time Finance Corp. v. Clark, 6 Conn. Cir. 200, 269 A.2d 88 (1969). See
generally 8A C.J.S. Bankruptcy § 521(8) (1962).
53 See note 13 supra.
[Vol. 7:3
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overcome this burden by attesting on the statement itself that they have, in
fact, relied upon the financial statement in granting credit.
54 While this
attestation clause would not be absolutely controlling, it would perhaps
help creditors in their efforts to show reliance.
D. The Creditor Must Show That the Debtor
Intended to Deceive Him
This fourth element of proof may be considered the most formidable
because of the obvious difficulties in attempting to prove another's state
of mind. Admittedly, a debtor's state of mind cannot be directly examined,
but his intent can usually be ascertained from his outward actions and
his own personal knowledge or experience.
5
Generally a creditor must show that the false financial statement
was uttered with conscious knowledge of its falsity
56 or with reckless
indifference as to its truthfulness.
57
If a financial statement is sufficiently detailed so as to require a
disclosure of all indebtedness,
58 a particular debtor will be hard pressed
to allege that he simply "forgot" to list one or more specific obligations.
The omission of such obligations would thus hopefully be considered
a prima facie indication of a conscious intention to deceive. Similarly, a
reckless indifference or disregard as to the truthfulness of a particular
financial statement may be considered to be made with knowledge of
its untruthfulness. 5
A particular debtor's education and/or business experience will often
be considered in any examination into his intent to deceive.
60 Obviously, a
college graduate or one with some particular experience in the business
community, should be held to a higher standard or duty, than 
a
high-school graduate who has little understanding or knowledge of
practical business necessity.
61 Unquestionably, a signed statement of any
debtor, without some incapacity, as to his financial condition should 
be
prima facie proof of his truthfulness or untruthfulness. If the statement 
is
in fact, false, the burden of proof should shift from the creditor to 
the
54 See Appendix II.
55 See 8 H. REMIoTON, BANKRUPTCY § 3320 (6th ed. 1955).
56 See L. TwiNEM, BANKRUPTCY GumE FOR CONSUMER FINANCE COMPANIES 
132 (6th
ed. 1964).
57 See 8 H. REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 3320 (6th ed. 1955).
58 See Appendix II. See also Sun Finance & Loan Co. v. Cononico, 20 Ohio Op. 
2d
289, 177 N.E.2d 84 (Mun. Ct. Ohio 1959) (undetailed small "postage stamp size"
financial statement negated creditor's claim).
59 See, e.g., Industrial Bank of Commerce v. Bissell, 219 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1955). See
also 8 H. REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 3320 (6th ed. 1955).
60 See, e.g., In re Hirsch, 140 F. Supp. 361 (E.D.N.Y. 1956); In re Anderson, 104
F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Wis. 1952).
61 See In re Sam, Bankr. No. 71-2075 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (Bankrupt was an expen-
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debtor, whereby the debtor should be required to show to the court's
satisfaction that he did not intend to deceive.62 In this same regard, frail
excuses should not be considered persuasive or result in a determination
in favor of the bankrupt. Since intent can only be shown by overt acts, the
bankrupt should not be allowed to simply assert that he could not
remember some obligations, particularly when the financial statement
requires sufficiently precise information.63
III. Who Determines (Who Should Determine) Section 17A(2)
Objections to Discharge
As mentioned previously, small loan companies have been very
harshly criticized for certain unscrupulous practices that have occurred in
some companies' objection to discharge.6 4 As a partial result of this
criticism, the Bankruptcy Act was amended in 1960 65 to limit an objecting
creditor's ability to totally negate a consumer bankrupt's right to a general
discharge.6 6 As a result of the 1960 amendment, consumer bankrupts can
no longer be refused a general discharge on the basis of one party's
objection. While this amendment has been generally lauded as being
beneficial to the individual bankrupt, it may also be considered beneficial
to the defrauded creditor.6 7 Therefore, the 1960 amendment provided a
more equitable result for both the bankrupt and the defrauded creditor.
Furthermore, by another amendment to the Bankruptcy Act which
became effective December 18, 1970,68 bankruptcy courts were vested
with the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the dischargeability of
individual debts.6 9 Formerly, a disgruntled creditor could sue in state court
for a determination that his particular claim was not dischargeable in
bankruptcy,70 because of the debtor's misrepresentations in obtaining the
62 Although this is not the majority position, it seems as if this position would perhaps
be more evenly balanced between the debtor and the objecting creditor. For a detaileddiscussion regarding the burden of proof in these matters, see Comment, FraudulentFinancial Statements and Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act-The Creditor's Dilemma,
1967 UTAH L. REv. 281, 284, n. 14.
63 If the creditor uses a detailed financial statement form and impresses the debtor
with its importance, these factors will go to buttress the creditor's claim.
64 See Comment, Bankruptcy Act: Abuse of Sections 14C(3) and 17A(2) by Small
Loan Companies, 32 IND. L.J. 151 (1957). See also Countryman, The New Dis-
chargeability Law, 45 AM. BA xa. L.J. 1, 10-11 (1971).65Act of July 12, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-621.
66 See Bankruptcy Act § 14c(3), 11 U.S.C. § 32c(3) (1970) [only business bankrupts
can now be denied a general discharge under § 14c(3)].6 7 Prior to the 1960 amendment, a creditor's successful objection under § 14c(3)
would result in denying the bankrupt a general discharge. Therefore all his creditors
would be free to seek collection of their claims. After 1960, one creditor's successful
objection under § 17a(2) would result only in a non-dischargeable claim as to that
creditor. Therefore, this one creditor would be free to seek collection of his claim
and would have a much better chance of collecting than if he had to compete with
numerous other creditors as in the pre-1960 procedure.
6 8 Act of October 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-467.69 See Bankruptcy Act § 2a(12), 11 U.S.C. § lla(12) (1970).
70 See Twinem, Bankruptcy Act Amended: Determination of Dischargeability of Debts
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debt in question. While this amendment has also been lauded as being
beneficial to the consumer-bankrupt, it also invests the bankruptcy referees
with the sole and exclusive power to determine the dischargeability of
individual obligations.7 Prior to the 1970 amendment, a creditor could
demand a jury trial in a state court proceeding, on questions regarding the
debtor's utterance of a materially false financial statement with the intent
to deceive and cause the creditor to rely thereon in granting credit.n2
The 1970 amendment to section 17 also provides that "Nothing in
this subdivision c shall be deemed to affect the right of any party, upon
timely demand, to a trial by jury, where such right exists."73 However, at
least one court has held that there is no right to a jury trial in section
17a(2) cases. 74 Thus, the amendments have conferred very broad powers
upon the referees which may or may not have been properly delegated to
them. In view of the pro-bankrupt philosophy that has existed since the
1970 amendment, in cases where small loan creditors filed section 17a(2)
objections, it is submitted that this power may have been improperly
placed.7 Furthermore, it is herein submitted that the right to a jury trial
in section 17a(2) objection cases, is not nearly as clear cut as some
commentators 7 and courts" would have us believe.
One noted bankruptcy commentator, Asa S. Herzog,78 has contended
in a recent article,7 that Congress intended to insure complainants the
right to a jury trial in section 17a(2) objection cases.80 Referee Herzog
contends that Congress was extremely hesitant in its quest to transfer
section 17a(2) objection cases to bankruptcy courts because these cases
"Mraditionally were tried in state courts before a judge and jury (footnote
in Bankruptcy Proceedings to be Made by Referee, 25 PERS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 18
(1970). See also Comment, Bankruptcy Act; Abuse of Sections 14C(3) and 17A(2) by
Small Loan Companies, 32 IND. L.J. 151, 155-9 (1957).
71See Bankruptcy Act § 2a(12), 11 U.S.C. § lla(12) (1970).
72 See Countryman, The New Dischargeability Law, 45 AM. BANKR. LJ. 1, 34-43
(1971).
73See Bankruptcy Act § 17c(5), 11 U.S.C. § 35c(5) (1970).
7 4 1n re Swope, 466 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973),
noted in, 26 PERS. FiN. L.Q. REP. 108 (1972).
75 When the BANKRUPTCY RULES AND OFFICIAL BANKRUPTCY FORMS were approved
by the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Douglas dissented to the Court's action, in part,
because he felt that the RULES gave referees too much power (on a different matter
than dischargeability). Perhaps they were given too much power over dischargeability
too.
76See Countryman, Jury Trials on Dischargeability-A Reply to Referee Herzog, 46
AM. BANKR. LJ. 305 (1972); Countryman, The New Dischargeability Law, 45 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 1, 34-43 (1971).
77 In re Swope, 466 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1972).
7S Referee in Bankruptcy, Southern District of New York; Member of the Judicial
Conference Committee on Bankruptcy Rules; Member of the National Bankruptcy
Conference.
79 See Herzog, The Case for Jury Trials on the Issue of Dischargeability, 46 AM.
BANKR. LJ. 235 (1972).
80 Id. at 237.
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omitted)."81 The article criticizes a recent case, In re Swope,82 which held
that there was no right to a jury trial in section 17a(2) cases. Referee
Herzog contends that the bankruptcy court's rationale ("[That the seventh
amendment to the Constitution [which] preserves the right to jury trial in
suits at common law... does not extend to bankruptcy proceedings which
fall within the equity jurisdiction of the court."8 3), nullified Congress' spe-
cific intention to preserve the right to a jury trial in section 17a(2) cases.8 4
In summation, Referee Herzog concluded:
mhe seventh amendment does not guarantee that right [to a jury
trial], and while jury trials do not ordinarily exist respecting estates
in custody of the bankruptcy courts, Congress has now said that the
right does exist in the area of dischargeability where the same issues
of fact would be resolved by a jury had the matter been left with
the state court.85
Another noted bankruptcy commentator, Professor Vern Country-
man, has adopted a different viewpoint from that expressed by Referee
Herzog.88 It is Professor Countryman's position that a creditor's objection
to discharge on the basis of section 17a(2) "[d]oes not present the
occasion for summoning a jury. The bankruptcy court may rule without
a jury on the dischargeability issue."87 In his reply to Referee Herzog,
Professor Countryman submits that Referee Herzog "[Is wrong and that
[the] new section 17c(5) of the Bankruptcy Act neither preserves nor
confers a right to jury trials on issues of dischargeability, as distinguished
from issues of liability or damages." 88 Professor Countryman contends
that section 17c(5) was not meant to confer A right to a jury trial but
only to preserve such a right where it previously existed.89 This viewpoint
is not completely incongruous to Referee Herzog's in that Referee Herzog
contends only that the right to a jury trial did exist prior to the 1970
amendment in state courts and that Congress meant to preserve that right
in bankruptcy court proceedings. 90 Professor Countryman, like Referee
Herzog, analyzes the legislative history of the 1970 amendment and
concludes that section 17c(5) "[W]ill usually operate to preserve existing
81 Id.
82466 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1972).
83 Herzog, The Case for Jury Trials on the Issue of Dischargeability, 46 AM. BAMff.
L.J. 235, 238 (1972).
84 Id.
85 Id. at 239-240.
86 See Countryman, Jury Trials on Dischargeability-A Reply to Referee Herzog, 46
AM. BANKR. L.J. 305 (1972).
87 Countryman, The New Dischargeability Law, 45 AM. BANKI. L.J. 1, 40 (1971).
88 Countryman, Jury Trials on Dischargeability-A Reply to Referee Herzog, 46 AM.
BAN rK. LJ. 305 (1972).
89 Id.
90 See Herzog, The Case for Jury Trials on the Issue of Dischargeability, 46 AM.
BANKE. U. 235, 239-40 (1972).
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rights to [a] jury trial on issues of liability and damages after the issue
of dischargeability is determined." 91
In and of itself, the debate on this point makes it rather obvious that
the jury trial question is not as clear cut as some courts have contended.92
An independent analysis of the legislative history of section 17c(5) has
proven equally unhelpful because either viewpoint may be supported by
this history.93 In essence, poor draftsmanship may have created the
confusion because the statement that the right to a jury trial is preserved
where such right exists does not answer the related question of whether
Congress intended to preserve the right as it existed in state courts when
creditors attempted to litigate the false financial statement issue or whether
Congress intended to preserve the right only as it previously existed in
the bankruptcy courts. However, if Professor Countryman's viewpoint is
adopted there is no right to a jury trial at all,94 and Congress' intent may
have been effectively circumvented.
This comment concurs in the viewpoint as expressed by Referee
Herzog.9 5 It seems inconceivable to assume that Congress meant to
preserve the right -to a jury trial on issues previously arising in bankruptcy
courts (dischargeability) when they were vesting those very courts with
exclusive jurisdiction over cases based upon false financial statements
which were previously tried in state courts before juries.9 6 Is it not more
logical to assume that Congress meant to preserve the right to a jury trial
on issues that were previously tried before both judge and jury, in state
court proceedings? This would appear to be the sounder contention.
Courts confronted with jury trial requests in section 17a(2) cases
should take the time to fully explore the question before blindly espousing
91 Countryman, Jury Trials on Dischargeability--A Reply to Referee Herzog, 46 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 305, 308 (1972).
92 See In re Swope, 466 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1972).
93 See 116 CoNo. Rec. 9549 (1970). Therein Congressman Wiggins stated:
One ground for opposition to some of the dischargeability bills introduced in
earlier years is resolved in S. 4247. It was said that compelling either the
bankrupt or the creditor to submit to the procedure contemplated in
the Bankruptcy Court might constitute unjust deprivation of the right to trial byjury. Section 7 of the bill adds a new Section 17c(5) to the Bankruptcy Act
which specifically protects the right to trial by jury upon timely demand where
such right presently exists.
But see Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee on the
Judiciary on Si. Res. 88, H.R. 6665 & H.R. 12250, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 69, 78
(1969) (Professor Countryman's statements). See also S. REP. 91-1173 (1970); H.R.
REP. No. 91-1502 (1970).
94 See 1A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY % 17.28A(6) (14th ed. 1971).
95 See Herzog, The Case for Jury Trials on the Issue of Dischargeability, 46 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 235 (1972).
96 See IA W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY % 17.28A(6), at 1742.3 (14th ed. 1972): Prior
to the 1970 amendments to § 17, creditors would bring suit in state court on the debt
after the bankrupt had received a discharge in bankruptcy and, as Collier points out:
When the affirmative defense of discharge was pleaded, the elements of false
financial statement and reliance [usually a § 17a(2) type lawsuit], would be
raised by the plaintiff in response to the affirmative defense, i.e., that the defense
was not valid because the debt was non-dischargeable under the Bankruptcy
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the theory of but one noted writer. 7 Congress should seek to definitively
clarify the issue so as to end the fruitless speculation that presently exists.
Furthermore, in light of the skepticism that exists among many
bankruptcy courts,98 how can litigants expect to secure an objective
analysis of the facts from the court alone? Obviously, they cannot. As
Referee Herzog so aptly pointed out: "[I]f the word gets out that a
particular referee is bankrupt oriented, that creditors do not stand a ghost
of a chance to succeed-who can fault the creditors for turning to a
jury demand to get a fair trial?" 99
IV. Conclusion
The whole of the foregoing discussion may, in fact, prove to be moot
if Congress should formulate legislation based upon the Report of the
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws (hereinafter Report).100 The
Commission, created in 1970 by a joint Congressional resolution,10' issued
its recommendations on July 30, 1973, after two years of study. The
Report, inter alia, recommends that section 17a(2) objections to discharge
in consumer bankruptcies be absolutely eliminated. 1°I
In his letter of July 30, 1973, to the President, Congress and the Chief
Justice, Mr. Harold Marsh, Jr., Chairman of the Commission, stated: 103
The system of bankruptcy administration is designed to deal with the
unfortunate situation where a debtor is not able to negotiate an
Act. If a jury trial had been demanded, the jury would consider all the facts,
including the falsity of the financial statement and the reliance. Granted that
there may well have been a right to a jury trial in the action on the debt, did
that right encompass the issue of dischargeability necessitating additional facts?
It seems not. Now, in the bankruptcy court the isue [sic] is strictly one of
dischargeability, a Bankruptcy Act issue.... In the case of an application under
§ 17c, the issue of dischargeability is the prime issue, although the court may
also have to determine if there is a debt. It may be, therefore, that there is, in
fact, no right to trial by jury preserved by § 17c(5) [under this theory].
Congress was aware of the state court practice, and it seems inconceivable to assume
that they would seek to preserve the right to a jury trial if, in fact, they knew no
such right would exist.
97 See Herzog, The Case for Jury Trials on the Issue of Dischargeability, 46 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 235 (1972). See also 1A W. COLLIMR, BAN UPTcY I 17.28A(6), at
1742.4 (14th ed. 1972), where it is stated in part:
It is clear, however, that Congress intended that a party should not be deprived
of his right to a jury trial if he makes a timely demand therefore. To effectuate
that intention, therefore, it may be argued that until this legislation all of the
underlying facts on both issues [liability and dischargeability] would have gone
to the jury, had one been demanded in the state court action, and that is what
has been preserved. This certainly would give more meaning to § 17c(5) and
the expressed intention of Congress.
98 See note 14 supra.
9 Herzog, The Case for Jury Trials on the Issue of Dischargeabillty, 46 AM. BANRI.
L.J. 235, 243 (1972).
100 See 251 BANKR. L. REP. (extra ed. August 3, 1973).
101 Senate Joint Resolution, No. 88, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., Pub. L No. 91-354, July
24, 1970.
102 See Report oi the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws, Summary oi Major Recom-
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accommodation with his creditors without resort to court; therefore,
by its very nature it involves a process which is unpleasant both to
the debtor and to his creditors. No recommendations will change this
fundamental fact. However, it is important that the objectives of this
system, to effect an equitable distribution of the assets of the debtor
and to relieve the honest but unfortunate debtor from the weight of
oppressive indebtedness, be accomplished as economically and
humanely as possible. Also, the efficiency of the process and the
rules applied in it have an impact on the entire credit economy
which goes far beyond the specific cases involved in the process
itself. [emphasis added].
These prefatory remarks seem completely incongruous with the
Commission's recommendations designed to eliminate section 17a(2)
objections to discharge. In one breath, the Commission submits that it
wants to effectuate the process whereby the honest debtor will be relieved
from his indebtedness but in a second breath, implies that even dishonest
debtors will be afforded the same equitable relief.
The Bankruptcy Act has been consistently characterized as providing
an equitable remedy'0 4 to those honest debtors who for one reason or
another have become financially unable to repay their outstanding
obligations.'05 A diligent search of available authority has admittedly
failed to uncover any opinion allowing a patently dishonest debtor the
right to an equitable remedy.
As early as 1935, the Supreme Court characterized bankruptcy
courts as "[e]ssentially courts of equity." 106 Since that time, numerous
federal courts have reached the same conclusion determining that since
these courts are courts of equity, they must be guided by equitable
principles or maxims in the exercise of their jurisdiction. 10 7 This does not
mean that general principles of equitable jurisprudence prevail over
statutory law, 08 but simply that equitable principles must be exercised
104 See Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Rock Island & Pacific R.R. Co., 294
U.S. 648, 675 (1935).
105 See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
106 See Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Rock Island & Pacific R.R. Co., 294
U.S. 648, 675 (1935).
107 See, e.g., Christensen v. Felton, 322 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1963) (Equity will not
permit one to benefit from his own wrong); Hull v. Powell, 309 F.2d 3 (9th Cir.
1962) (Application of laches doctrine); Margolis v. Nazareth Fair Grounds & Farm
Market, 249 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1957) (Fraud will not prevent substantial justice);
Frazier v. Ash, 234 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1956) (Equity should not be considered with
refinements); In re Gravure Paper & Board Corp., 234 F.2d 928 (3rd Cir. 1956)
(Equity will not permit inequitable results); In re Physicians & Dentists Investment
Corp., 248 F. Supp. 968 (S.D. Cal. 1966) (Bankruptcy court has power to see that
complete justice is done); In re Tracy, 194 F. Supp. 293 (N.D. Calif. 1961)
(Bankruptcy court may deny relief upon equitable principles); In re Beam, 163
F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Ala. 1958) (Application of clean hands doctrine).
108 See Burton Coal Co. v. Franklin Coal Co., 67 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1933); In re
Romanac, 245 F. Supp. 882 (W.D. Va. 1965); In re Aero Bulk Manufacturing Co.,
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within the confines of the Act.10 9
Coming now to the Commission's proposal designed to eliminate
section 17a(2) objections to discharge, it can be readily determined that
several important equitable maxims would undoubtedly be circumvented
if this proposal was implemented:
(1) Equity regards that as done which ought to be done;
(2) [HMe who seeks equity must do equity;
(3) [H]e who comes into equity must come with clean hands;
(4) [E]quity will not suffer a wrong without a remedy.1'0
These general principles have little to do with strict notions of
jurisdiction as such, but are generally regarded as principles applicable
in the decision making process." One author has rightly contended
that the "clean hands doctrine" operates as a constraint upon equitable
jurisdiction in that a party with "unclean hands" should not be afforded
an equitable remedy~n 2
The foregoing discussion now brings us to the ultimate question:
Should a dishonest debtor be afforded the equitable remedy of a discharge
in bankruptcy as to a creditor whom he has in fact defrauded? Clearly
the answer must be no.-' A debtor with "unclean hands" should not be
able to benefit by his own wrong to the disadvantage of the defrauded
creditor. To put both honest and dishonest debtors on the same footing
would be to completely circumvent time-tested and honored equitable
principles. If all debtors are allowed the right to a discharge without
objection, dishonesty will be rewarded and thereby encouraged. Congress
should take a hard and long look at this particular recommendation. If it
simply "rubber stamps" the Commission's proposal, there no longer will
be any forum in which to raise questions of dishonesty?' 4 In essence,
creditors may simply have to drastically curtail their lending operations
to the detriment of all consumers who are "on the borderline." As section
17a(2) objections now stand, a creditor has an almost impossible burden
of proof, and any proposal designed to eliminate even this objection must
be scrutinized very carefully indeed.
DAvID L. HERBERT
109 See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939) where the Court stated:
[T]his Court has held that for many purposes "courts of bankruptcy are essen-
tially courts of equity, and their proceedings inherently proceedings in equity"
... By virtue of §2 [of the Bankruptcy Act] a bankruptcy court is a court of
equity at least in the sense that in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred
upon it by the Act, it applies the principles and rules of equity jurisprudence....
lO See 2 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 363 (5th ed. 1941).
I See K. YoRx & J. BAUMAN, CASES & MATERIALS ON REMEmES, 113 (2d ed. 1973).
112 Id.
113 See, e.g., In re Beam, 163 F. Supp. 333, 335 (N.D. Ala. 1958) (the court refused
to affirm a referee's decision granting a discharge, where the bankrupt had come into
court with unclean hands).
114 See Proposed Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act Treated in Position Paper Filed
by National Consumer Finance Association with National Bankruptcy Commission,
26 PERs. FN. L.Q. REP. 51 (1972).
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APPLICATION AND FINANCIAL STATEMENT*
For the purpose of showing my ability to repay said loan and to induce
you to grant said loan, I hereby declare that a list of all my debts and
liabilities is as follows:
Mark "X"NAMES OF CREDITORS by those
Debts you
Be sure to Include all debts owed on real estate will pay AMOUNT MONTHLY
mortgages, contracts on automobiles, furniture, etc., with OWED INSTALMENT
loans with loan companies or banks, as well as proceeds BEING PAID
other obligations or claims. of thisLoan
PRESENT BALANCE ON PRIOR LOAN WITH YOU $ $
TOTALS -- -. $ $
If the above spaces are not sufficient, please
list any additional debts on the back hereof.
YOU MUST LIST ALL OF YOUR DEBTS.
My salary is $ per - My income from other sources
is$ per
I hereby state, affirm, represent and warrant to you that my total




* This financial statement form is deficient in several important aspects. It does not
provide sufficient space; it does not adequately point out specific groups of creditors
that are to be included; it does not warn the consumer of the ramifications of less
than a complete disclosure; it does not provide the loan office with any means to
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NOTICE If you knowingly give a false Statement regarding your credit, and the lender
relies on it in part in making the loan, your obligation would be not dischargeable In
bankruptcy. For your benefit this Credit Statement should be true and complete.
(Corporate Name) Date,
Addresq
In connection with my application to you for a loan of $ , I hereby
submit the following information for the purpose of showing my ability to
repay the same and to induce you to grant said loan. I hereby represent and
warrant to you that a full complete and correct list of ALL my debts and
liabilities and other claims against me of $25.00 or more is as follows:
NAMES OF CREDITORS
Be sure to include ALL DEBTS owed on:
1. Real Estate Mortgages Mark"X"
2. Contracts on Automobiles, Furniture, etc. by those
3. Loans with Finance Companies, Credit Unions Debts you MONTHLY
or Banks will pay AMOUNT INSTAI.MENT
4. Credit Card Obligations with OWED BEING PAIDproceeds5. Charge Accounts of this
6. Medical Expenses Loan
7. All other Obligations:
PRESENT BALANCE ON PRIOR LOAN WITH YOU: _ $ $















TOTALS - $ $
If above spaces are not sufficient, please list
any additional debts on the back hereof.
YOU MUST LIST ALL OF YOUR DEBTS OVER $25.00
[Vol. 7:3
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PLEASE READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS
Before completing and signing this statement below PLEASE REVIEW all your debts
carefully. Be sure you have disclosed ALL YOUR DEBTS of all kinds and that the facts
stated In this statement are correct. DO NOT OMIT ANY DEBTS. We rely upon your good
faith and the truth of your representations.
For your protection against an over extension of credit, you are requested above to list
each and all of your debts, liabilities and claims against you which are in excess of
$25.00. If you have no other debts, liabilities, etc., please Initial the box alongside
statement below and affix your signature beneath it.
I have no debts and liabilities in excess of $25.00 other than those listed
hereon. I certify that I have not been instructed by the Lender to which
Initial I have made an application for a loan to list only certain debts. Insteadthis box my instructions have been to list all outstanding debts and liabilities.
Signature of Borrower
My "take-home" pay is $ per. My net income from
other sources is $ per I hereby state, affirm, represent
and warrant to you that my total indebtedness and liabilities on this date
do not exceed $.
wrTNESS: Name
Address_
FOR LOAN OFFICE USE ONLY
Before approving the making of a loan to the above named borrower, I
carefully examined this Statement and relied upon it in passing upon the
credit worthiness of such borrower.
Signer Title
BOR 2-1 Ed. Apr. '73
* This financial statement form provides sufficient space for all groups of creditors;
it warns the consumer of the consequences of uttering a false statement; it provides
an attestation clause on the statement itself, whereby the loan officer can indicate
that he has, in fact, relied upon the statement in granting credit.
0 Corporal Punishment in the Public Schools:
The Legal Questions
INTRODUCTIONP UBLIC EDUCATION in the United States has come a long way since the
one-room schoolhouse days. This phenomenal growth has been paced
by the controversy surrounding the use of corporal punishment as a
means of enforcing discipline in the schools. From the oldest reported
case reaching the issue of corporal punishment' back in 1833 down to
the present,2 the proponents of corporal punishment have had to defend
their actions in the courts from a wide variety of attacks based on
criminal law, tort law, state statutes, school board regulations and, most
recently, constitutional guarantees. Although the attacks on corporal
punishment have been largely unsuccessful, the recognition by the courts
of the substantive and procedural constitutional rights of students who
I Commonwealth v. Fell, 11 Haz. Reg. 179 (Pa. Com. P. 1833).
2 Simns v. Waln, Civil No. 4526 (S.D. Ohio, filed Sept. 18, 1973).
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